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PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE-BASED 





A central concept in the evolution of public management has been an intentional blurring 
of the distinctions between the public and private sectors. In the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD), the Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) initiative, launched in 2001, is 
intended to create a “level playing field” where in-house or contracted organizations are 
selected for logistics support of a given commodity or weapon system based on 
performance rather than the nature of the source.  This article provides a preliminary 
discussion of PBL initiatives and assesses the extent to which they appear to be 
representative of a significant adoption of public management principles by DOD 
leaders. This review found that while individual DOD organizations have experienced 
successes and significant lessons learned with PBL, there are significant areas where 
policy direction remains contradictory and embryonic. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Kelman has emphasized that in comparison with traditional policy analysis, public 
management (PM) is concerned with a prescriptive focus on implementation, “what 
actually had to happen inside the government for a good idea to turn into reality.”  
Similarly, PM’s emphasis is oriented toward strategic actions by senior leaders, in 
particular those interacting with the political system (Kelman, 2003: 2; Barzelay, 2001: 
157-158). Jones has suggested that PM scholars “search for the presence of sufficient 
inputs (political, economic, social, cultural) to form a ‘critical mass’ of elements 
necessary to support management change and reform” (Jones, 2003: 10), including 
specific results and outcomes (Jones, 2003: 11).  
A key underlying concept of PM is a de-emphasis of the differences between 
management in the public and private sectors (Thompson, 2003: 5; Borins, 2002).  
Similarly, Jones has expressed the view that compared to traditional public administration 
(PA), PM “pays more attention to the operation of governments from the perspective of 
their interaction with the environments in which they operate” (Jones, 2003: 10). In the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), these management interactions would correspond 
with the inter-relationships between the ranks of political appointees and with leaders in 
Congress and the private sector, rather than exclusively with relationships among the 
ranks of career civil servants and members of the military. 
Kelman has also commented that organizational issues especially relevant to public 
organizations receive “grossly insufficient attention from the mainstream of academic 
management research” (Kelman, 2003: 4). In the general context of the U.S. government, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert have commented that the record of implementation of reforms has 
been “patchy,” partially due to the disconnected structure of budget functions, agency 
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organization, and the jurisdictions of Congressional committees (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004: 305). These specific factors may have further discouraged impetus for public 
management reform research in the U.S. context. 
By improving the quality of research dealing with the actual workings of public sector 
organizations, Kelman has expressed the view that PM research will produce better 
prescription that will aid in the practice of PM (Kelman, 2003: 5). Jones has mentioned 
that PM researchers have a specific interest in determining “appropriate service delivery 
methods, differential pricing alternatives and, even different institutional arrangements 
for the provision of services including provision by the private and not-for-profit sectors” 
(Jones, 2003: 11). In this vein, research into DOD logistics fits very much into the 
tradition of PM research. As Gansler et al have commented, barriers to change in 
government logistics “can be dismantled or worked around, and the steps that leading 
companies have taken can provide ideas for achieving government change” (Gansler et 
al, 2004b: 20). A significant part of this evolution is the emphasis on competition and 
transaction costs, arising from public choice theory and the new economics of 
organization. These concepts are contributing to the management of logistics challenges 
such as contracting (Jones and Thompson, 1999: 13).   
In this article, I make an attempt to assess efforts to reform logistics activities within 
DOD within the context of PM. Within the military environment, logistics includes “the 
integration of strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, 
while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units.” Logistics includes activities 
such as supply, maintenance, transportation, procurement and contracting, distribution, 
and sustainment (U.S. Department of Defense 2000: v). Logistics reform is critical to 
DOD; as an example, 22 percent of U.S. Air Force aircraft are estimated to be 
unavailable at any given time due to lack of spare parts (Gansler et al, 2004a: 5). 
Furthermore, the increasing use of contractors for logistics support, including in deployed 
environments such as Iraq, has further elevated the importance of this function as a senior 
management concern within DOD (Blizzard, 2004). During the decade of the 1990s, 
private sector logistics, or its close synonym, supply chain management, underwent 
fundamental changes that are beginning to have a profound effect on public sector 
logistics activities. These changes include: 
 
• advances in information technology; 
• more demanding customers; 
• globalization; 
• emphasis on cost cutting and industry consolidation; 
• enhanced importance of service and shorter product life cycles; and, 
• deregulation of the transportation industry (Gansler et al, 2004a: 10-11). 
 
This article begins by reviewing DOD’s strategy for modifying (or “transforming”) its 
logistics activities by leveraging private sector logistics innovations. I then discuss how 
this evolution affects the relationship between the government and private sector logistics 
providers, including how DOD has attempted to modify the policy context for the public-
private relationship. Finally, I review the experience to date with certain logistics reform 
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The Quadrennial Defense Review, which is DOD’s overarching policy document, 
mandated the agency to implement “performance based logistics” (PBL), in order to 
“compress the supply chain and improve readiness for major weapons systems and 
commodities” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001: 56). Logistics reform efforts, which 
are known by a wide variety of terms including PBL, product support, agile logistics, 
future logistics enterprise, and precision logistics, all share certain common traits.  First, 
there is a clear emphasis on increased private sector involvement in the delivery of 
military logistics activities. Second, the theme of fundamental and continuing change—
“transformation” is a common term—permeates this broad range of activities (Jones and 
Thompson, 1999; Apgar and Keane, 2004). DOD has made PBL the preferred approach 
for supporting weapon systems: 
 
PBL utilizes a performance-based acquisition strategy, versus the 
traditional transaction-based approach. PBL allows [weapon system 
program managers] to optimize performance and cost objectives through 
the strategic implementation of varying degrees of Government-Industry 
partnerships (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002). 
A complementary view of PBL has been presented as follows: 
 
PBL thus embodies a premise of military leadership called “commander’s 
intent”: present the vision, strategy, and goals, but encourage subordinates 
to choose their methods. Companies decided which best practices to adopt.  
Payment is based on performance, with incentives for time and cost 
savings (Apgar and Keane, 2004). 
 
As Jones as commented, “the goals of system change from the perspective of PM are 
more oriented towards reduced cycle time, increased quality and reducing costs for 
citizens than to the satisfaction of more narrow internal efficiency criteria…” (Jones, 
2003: 12). Similarly, a major case study research effort led by the IBM Center for The 
Business of Government found that the key to results in logistics resided in “internal and 
external digital integration, including new linkages between logistics, procurement, and 
finance operations” (Gansler and Luby, 2004: xi). These success factors are consistent 
with DOD’s current goals for PBL, as codified by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (AT&L), are listed in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
Objects of AT&L Goals and Subgoals Relevant to Services Acquisition 
 
Goal No.       Object of Goal   Object of Subgoals* 
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1 Credibility and effectiveness 
of acquisition logistics 
support 
Acquisition cycle time, operations and sustainment 
costs, infrastructure costs, competitive sourcing, 
customer satisfaction 
2 Quality and morale of AT&L 
workforce 
Requirements, experience levels, skill mix, 
[personnel displaced] 
3 Health of defense industrial 
base 
Competition, efficiency, [small and disadvantaged 
business] 
4 Link between infrastructure 
and defense strategy 
Management support for initiatives, [responsiveness, 
continuity] 
a
The bracketed items are sub-goals not formally associated with the related goals by 
AT&L but nonetheless of importance to AT&L. 
 
Source: Camm et al (2004: 9) 
 
 
Third, all of these logistics reform efforts necessarily recognize that the private sector 
has always played a dominant role in DOD logistics, even from the viewpoint of simply 
manufacturing weapon systems such as aircraft, ships, and tanks, as well as the spare 
parts necessary to support these systems when they are in operation. Fourth, there is a 
clear emphasis on rewarding contractors for performance in supporting the operational 
availability of weapon systems, rather than simply complying with narrowly defined 
contractual provisions (Apgar and Keane, 2004; Doerr, Eaton, and Lewis, 2004). 
The fundamental change brought about by PBL and its associated initiatives has been 
to directly involve manufacturers and other firms in the direct support of weapon systems 
while they are deployed in the field, such as maintaining an aircraft while it is based in 
Iraq, including provision of contractor personnel directly alongside their military 
counterparts. Kelman has made the prescient comment that contracting is important 
because “we need to train our public sector network managers how to influence to the 
work of people that do not work for them directly and from what I can see we don’t really 
know how to do that very well (the lore is not well developed)” (Kelman, 2003: 8). 
 
THE PARADOX OF SHIFTING ROLES 
It is significant that Jones has commented that PM places more emphasis “on the role of 
the manager as an active and motivation agent…whereas PA tends to view administrators 
as those who more passively execute the will of their political masters” (Jones, 2003: 11).  
A RAND study of DOD contracting (including in logistics) by Camm et al (2004) 
confirmed that outsourcing tended to transfer day-to-day management of activities from 
government personnel to contractors. This shift in emphasis for DOD then allowed the 
government “to think more strategically about how to link contract services to users’ 
needs or to simplify the process users face to get access to contractor services” (Camm et 
al, 2004: xvi). Jones has also mentioned that PM tends to focus on [I]ncentives and 
disincentives … on the input side to government and governance, and on the results or 
outputs and outcomes of what networks of government agencies and other entities 
produce. The application of what is termed the production function model (input > 
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production/workload measures > output and output measures > output and output 
measures > outcomes and outcomes measures in a feedback loop) is far more prevalent in 
PM and often is sneered at as to much a product of business thinking by many PM 
scholars (Jones, 2003: 12). 
Consistent with Jones’ comments is a trend toward blurring the boundaries between 
the public and private sectors. Within DOD, public-private partnerships and joint 
provision of services are indicative of a trend toward a broader range of relationships 
between two formerly very distinct entities (Camm et al, 2004: xvi; Kamensky and 
Burlin, 2004). 
 
AN UNCERTAIN POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
DOD efforts to reform logistics, particularly through increased private sector 
involvement, can best be characterized as a tapestry of initiatives that share common 
characteristics and major distinctions. In particular, the consensus seems to have emerged 
that while encouraged by the top leadership of DOD (the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD)), none of the documented reform initiatives can be traced back to OSD 
policy direction (Camm et al, 2004: xvii; Gansler and Luby, 2004: xi).   
What seems to have occurred is a case of emergent policy rather than explicit or 
deliberate policy, with little relationship between actual reform and strategic goals 
(Mintzberg, 1994: 24-27). The Defense Business Board, a senior advisory council 
appointed by the Secretary of Defense, confirmed the lack of standard guidance on PBL 
and expressed the need for a “business case analysis” to determine if PBL is even the 
most suitable approach for a given weapon system (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003: 
4), despite the current existence of high-level guidance mentioned mandating that an 
equivalent analysis be performed before selecting contractor or in-house (also known as 
“organic”) logistics support. The relationship between OSD policy and actual 
implementation of PBL is at best a tangential one: 
 
For example, high-level priorities favoring competitive sourcing or 
outsourcing probably helped promote interest in using contract sources.  
But no one had to develop the creative approaches to using contractors 
displayed [in this report] to comply with those priorities.  Similarly, high-
level support for applying manpower ceilings in theater increased attention 
to using contractors to support deployed forces; creative acquisition 
strategies made it much easier to use contractors in theater (Camm et al, 
2004: xvii). 
 
Part of the challenge in determining whether PBL or in-house support represents the 
optimal approach for DOD resides in the fundamental decision as to which functions are 
most effectively assigned to government. Despite OSD direction, it is the individual 
services that must actually manage complex weapon systems. While there might be 
enthusiasm for outsourcing as a means of reducing the size of government, the process of 
shedding certain public-sector responsibilities creates new ones. In particular, the DOD 
oversight of contractors becomes critical when these firms’ roles evolve from simply 
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supplying or repairing individual components such as engines or brakes to managing and 
integrating entire weapon systems (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004; Camm 
et al, 2004: xvi).   
The paradox is that because of the increased importance of oversight, outsourcing can 
increase, rather than decrease, the importance of certain government functions such as 
contract administration. Partially because of the difficulties of effective oversight, the 
GAO found that the private firms it studied had avoided outsourcing the management of 
entire systems, preferring to contract for support for individual components while 
keeping responsibility for management of entire systems in-house (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004). 
 
DOD EXPERIENCE WITH PERFORMANCE-BASED LOGISTICS 
Having reviewed six cases of PBL, a RAND Corporation study pragmatically viewed the 
OSD role in future initiatives as a limited one. Suggested OSD involvement was 
restricted to linking individual service and DOD strategic goals, managing congressional 
concerns, and disseminating lessons learned (Camm et al, 2004: xviii). The IBM study 
mentioned above (Gansler and Luby, 2004), based on five private sector and five 
government cases of logistics reform, took a more aggressive stance. The authors 
believed that fundamental legislative and regulatory change, significant shifts in the 
management of human resources, and aggressive leadership by senior government 
personnel (most likely at the political appointee level) could bring about widespread 
changes in how DOD manages its logistics activities.   
For example, there are over 1,000 information technology (IT) systems associated 
with DOD logistics; the IBM study recommended that DOD adopt interoperability 
standards modeled on the acquisition by Boeing of McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell.   
The point here is not to minimize the complexity of DOD’s IT problems or gratuitously 
distinguish DOD challenges from private sector ones, but to point out the varying 
advocacy positions taken by outside analysts in making recommendations on DOD 
logistics reform. 
A related issue deals with legislative, or more accurately, political barriers.  For 
example, a statutory provision known as the “50/50 rule” requires half of all government 
depot work (heavy maintenance) to be performed in government depots (such as Air 
Logistics Centers or Naval Shipyards) by government personnel (U.S. Code, Title 10, 
Section 2466). The fact that over 64,000 government employees are involved in this work 
(and are represented by a Congressional Depot Caucus) gives some indication of the 
“immovability” of this provision. The IBM study reasonably states that the current 
situation “raises program costs and diminishes performance, compared to commercial 
situations, when free competition occurs” (Gansler et al, 2004b: 36).   
An analogous situation arises with the division of congressional appropriations to 
DOD into what are commonly termed “colors or money.” For example, separate funding 
is provided for capital equipment vs. spare parts, which significantly limits managers 
attempting to coordinate a single overall relationship with a commercial PBL provider 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2003a: 4; U.S. Department of Defense, 2004: 20).  
Furthermore, budgets are managed on a yearly basis, making long-term relationships with 
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contractors difficult. In reviewing recommendations for change, it is important to bear in 
mind that PM necessarily occurs in a context. The application of private sector principles 
such as competition or performance goals is meant to be nuanced by the unique realities 
of government. 
Despite what could be termed externally imposed regulatory constraints to effective 
management of PBL, the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO)) has emphasized that the Army and Navy may be making 
support decisions “without knowing whether expected readiness improvements and cost-
reduction goals are being met, where adjustments are needed, or the conditions under 
which the various support approaches are likely to achieve the most cost-effective results. 
The GAO found that the choice of a PBL approach had been documented and justified in 
only 11 of the 75 weapon systems reviewed (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002: 3). 
The findings echoed the GAO’s earlier work on the Air Force, where it was determined 
that, with the exception of the C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft and B-2 Spirit bomber, 
there was no data available to support the decision to outsource support for 35 systems 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001: 2). In a related study, the GAO found that in the 
case of a sample of 14 private firms examined, “performance-based contracting works 
better for subsystems and components where available cost and performance data are 
sufficient to establish a good business case analysis, noting that this is more difficult to 
accomplish for new systems, where performance data are uncertain” (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004: 13). 
The DOD Inspector General (IG), in examining a PBL contract for the F/A-18 E/F 
fighter/attack aircraft, known as FIRST (F/A-18E/F Integrated Readiness Support 
Teaming Program), raised similar questions.  FIRST was established between the Navy 
and Boeing to provide a wide range of logistics support for the F/A-18 E/F, including 
depot-level maintenance (i.e. heavy overhauls) and provision of spare parts. The IG found 
that the Navy did not have adequate data to justify the outsourcing of support for the 
aircraft, and asserted that a case could have been made to keep support in-house.  (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2003b: 4-17). The IG’s findings echoed the previously-cited 
view by Jones “the goals of system change from the perspective of PM are more oriented 
towards reduced cycle time, increased quality and reducing costs for citizens than to the 
satisfaction of more narrow internal efficiency criteria…” (Jones, 2003: 12).  In this 
context, the Navy’s response to the IG report on the issue of performance metrics is of 
interest: 
 
The Navy also commented that it did not need metrics for tracking repair 
cycle times and reliability improvements identified in the acquisition plan.  
However, the Navy identified the repair cycle time and reliability 
improvements as desired objectives needed to meet the estimated FIRST 
life-cycle cost reductions. The Navy did not agree to track infrastructure 
support costs as a percentage of actual material costs but did agree to 
charge customers prices based on actual costs. We fail to see how the 
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Similarly, research into supply response times under the FIRST contract found that 
while certain repair parts were delivered more rapidly under FIRST that through the 
traditional military supply chain, these improvements might not have any impact on 
actual readiness (availability for flight) of aircraft. The authors also found that the FIRST 
contract essentially outsourced the existing Navy supply chain without any fundamental 
improvements, transferring to the private sector the inefficiencies of the Navy supply 
chain while possibly threatening logistics as a core competency. Finally, the authors 
called for a clarification of the Navy’s definition of what logistics functions should be 
retained internally, accompanied by research into providing quantifiable metrics for the 
FIRST contract (Noll and Simonson, 2002). 
In summary, DOD experience with PBL shows mixed results, perhaps some of which 
can be traced back to a possible degree of confusion in policy development. It is unclear 
where the disparate objectives of reducing costs, improving the effectiveness or 
availability of weapon systems, or leveraging private sector innovation translate into a 
coherent implementation, prioritized strategy for the military services. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In their comparative study of public management reform, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 
301) express the view that the U.S. system of government is characterized by a “business-
oriented” and “free enterprise” culture where “it has been very easy for private sector 
management concepts to enter to public sector.” The same authors have also emphasized 
that the current Bush Administration has strongly emphasized competitive outsourcing 
and the advantages of competition (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 304). Within this 
context, I have attempted to follow the advice of Jones and Thompson (1999: 16) and 
“describe what managers do and try to explain what works and what doesn’t.” 
 This review of performance-based logistics initiatives within DOD shows decidedly 
mixed results. The dominant finding is that measuring success in itself is frustrated, if not 
outright excluded, by the design of existing systems and procedures that are not meant to 
provide comparative data on the performance of outsourced versus in-house logistics 
services. It should be noted, however, that this review was limited to studies in the public 
domain. While these were decidedly more limited in number than those available 
internally within DOD or its contractors, this research, which examined  existing 
performance-based logistics initiatives, did have the advantage of having been performed 
by credible organizations with sound public research reputations. 
Within the above context, some implications emerge. The first is that in an 
environment of innovation, changes in public policy may almost inevitably precede the 
procedural changes and sustained leadership needed to fully validate those policy 
decisions. Empirical research into the relative success of public management reforms is 
certainly desirable, but the issue arises of whether adequate and available data exists to 
perform the evaluative examinations that underlie that research. 
Second, due to the commonalities associated with the logistics support of weapon 
systems, research comparing the experiences in supporting these different systems (such 
as ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.) within DOD would be of great interest. The initial work 
carried out by RAND (Camm et al, 2004) represents a step in this direction. There is also 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6     Issue 2  ·   2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
124 
 
strong potential for international comparative work on the outsourcing of military 
logistics, especially since many nations share identical or similar weapon systems.  
 
Ira Lewis is Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs, Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School:  ialewis@nps.edu 
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